Addressing the sovereign debt crisis: Restructuring theeurozone's debt composition at no cost to taxpayersSummary: The objective of Policy 1 is to restructure the eurozone's sovereign debt at no cost to the German taxpayer (or to any of the surplus member-states taxpayers) but at some cost to the banks that draw liquidity from the ECB without posting creditworthy collateral. The motivating idea is that the ECB helps member-states, at no cost to itself, to reduce their Maastricht-compliant debt. Recall that each member-state is 'permitted' by Maastricht to bear debt equal to 60% of its GDP. Let's call this 6 Maastricht-compliant debt. Member-states ought to be allowed to apply to the ECB for a tranche transfer of that Maastricht-compliant debt (see 1.1 above). These bonds can be registered (by the bondholders) with a division of the ECB which undertakes to service them. The ECB then issues its own long term e-bonds (which are its sole liability; i.e. no requirement for any member-state to issue any guarantees or cash) - see 1.2 above. Judging by the fact that the sale of the problematic ebonds issued by the EFSF in December 2010 yielded particularly low interest rates, the ECB's e-bonds will sell at rates no greater from the German bunds. Member-states will, thus, be indebted to the ECB but their debts will be amortised and paid annually and in the long term at low effective interest rates reflecting those of the ECB's e-bonds - see 1.3 above. The fact that the bonds of each participating member-state are registered with a division of the ECB means that the ECB can make medium term large liquidity provisions to the private banks conditional on haircuts over the existing sovereign bonds in their portfolio - see 1.4 above. This measure, together with the passing on to member-states of prior haircuts exacted by the ECB on bonds purchased in the context of the ECB's bond purchasing scheme effective since last May - see 1.5 - will reduce the overall debt burden of the eurozone's member-states at zero cost to taxpayers.